argins of the US are within reach of today »stech - nological capability and approximately 409,000,000 (46% of the total) is within reach of our near-term capability. The real question is what these 409,000,000 acres hold for us in the way of petroleum reserves. Mother Nature, in the past, while yielding up bountif ul petroleum resources, has tended to put very large portions inrelatively few spots, and no one willreally know ifthis acreage contains significant reserves untilit has been tested by the drill. Our success or failurein so doing will influence greatly the importance of and the rateat which we pursue those portions of the continental margins not presently within our capability. Therefore, we should pursue with all vigor and haste those areas that are within our present-and near-term technological grasp and, at the same time, we must continue to provide the necessary R & D programs thatwillinsuretheabil ity to develop feasible solutions for those areas thatare not presently within our capability. Some Implications of Accelerated Offshore Leasing Technological capability is one thing; however, there are several other important considerations that must be examined. The economic aspect is one which looms inall our minds as perhaps even more formidable than technology and although not discussed inthis paper, I certainly do not want to minimize that aspect. I would, however, like to discuss some of the considerations regarding industry response to hopefully accelerated offshore leasing. I n the report" US Energy Outlook1« a preprint of which was released in December 1972 by the National Petroleum Council:,, several cases of accelerated domes ticoil and gas drillingactivity were examined (Chapter IV). The highest growth rate hypothesized in that report was a 7.5 percent annual increase in exploratory drilling footage (labeled Case I). This increase in drillingactivity would achieve a level of activityin 1985 about equal to the post World War I1 peak activity achieved in 1955. Figure 55 illustrates, in summary, the impact of this case on the domestic energy and petroleum imports. The dotted lines correspond to the same activity level as Case I but a lower finding rate. I think these two curves can be summarized as follows. By 1985, assuming the increased acti - vity becomes areality, the best we can do (high finding rate) is to achieve a level of dependence on foreign sources about equal to our currentlevel. It is possible, however, (low finding rate) that we would be able to only arrest any further dependence beyond 1975. Although the NPC report does not give a completely detailed breakdown of the total offshore portion of the activity, enough detailis given by region to estimate that which may be attributableto the offshore. Figure 56 was derived by applying the regional allocations for oil and gas drilling to the totaloil and gas drillingfor Case I. These results include only California, Gulf Coast and A tlantic offshore (most of that which is hypothesized), and for oildrilling, the regional allocations given for »exploratory footage are assumed to apply to totaloildrilling footage. Under these assumptions, the total offshore drillingin 1975 would be about 18M feet per year increasing to about 41M feet per year by 1985. Assuming that all of the exploratory footage (approximately 1/3 of the total footage) would be drilled from mobile platforms and the other 2/3 would be drilled from fixed platforms, Figure 57...
