ve intellect: the matter is the principle of potentiality (unknown). Let us see now how Abelard deals with abstraction :
In relation to abstraction it must be known that matter and form always subsist mixed together, but the reason of the mind has this power, that it may now consider matter by itself; it may now turn its attention to form alone; it may now conceive both intermingled. The two first processes, of course, are by abstraction; they abstract something from things conjoined that they may consider its very nature. But the third process is by conjunction . For example, the substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and invested in infinite forms ; when I turn my attention to this in the material essence of the substance, after having circumscribed all forms, I have a concept by a process of abstraction. Again when I consider only corporeity in it, which I join to substance, that concept likewise (although it is by conjunction with respect to the first, which considered only the nature of substance) is formed also by abstraction with respect to other forms than corporeity, none of which I consider, such as animation, sensuality, rationality, whiteness.
Conceptions of this sort through abstraction seemed perhaps false and vain for this reason, that they perceive the thing otherwise than it subsists. For since they are concerned with matter by itself or form separately, and since none the less neither of these subsists separately, they seem obviously to conceive the thing otherwise than it is, and therefore to be empty. But this is not so (184). br/>
Abstraction in any case is not empty for Abelard because it considers "the qualities the nature has "even though it does" not consider all that it has ". When he considers "only this one among the qualities the nature has the only refers to the attention alone, not to the mode of subsisting " . This process on one hand could be understood to be arbitrary (because we could choose where to point our attention), but on the other hand it is restricted by the nature of things necessarily, and in the second sense is realistic. "Otherwise it would not be reason, but opinion, that is if the understanding should deviate from the state of the thing "(184). So, the concept formed in the mind by abstraction is a realistic one . But it is always limited always considering only part of the nature of the thing.
There is room to think that the abstraction is not the only way how we get the realistic concepts of the world of physics. Abelard is a monk and a theologian, and not just a natural philosopher. He definitely believes in God, Supreme Intellect and Providence, miracles and prophets. How is it possible to have knowledge of things before they actually exist? It is not by way of abstraction. The ideas of things and their relations should be able to exist before the very things exist, otherwise prophecies would not be possible. In his writings on universals Abelard does not go too far to investigate this, but there are passages, suggesting that the problem entered his mind in a peculiar form:
But the following question arises concerning the providence of the artist, whether it is empty when he holds in mind the form of a work still future, seeing that the thing is not yet constituted so. But if we grant that, we are forced to say that likewise the providence of God is empty, which he had before the creation of his work. . . Consequently, modifying the words we should say that the providence is not empty ... (185)
Abelard promises: "There will be a fuller investigation of this in relation to the on Interpretation ", but he also says:" any question concerning the understanding with respect to God is superfluous ", and in the regular case of our knowledge he returns "to the conception of universals which must always be formed by abstraction "(185). But what is the nature of this abstraction compare to the abstraction of the concept of things?
When I hear man or whiteness or white I do not recall from the meaning of the noun all the natures or properties which are in the subject things, but from man I have only the conception although confused, not discrete , of animal and rational mortal, but not of the later accidents as well. For the conceptions of individuals, too, are formed by abstraction, when namely it is said: this substance, this body, this animal, this man, this whiteness, this white. For by this man I consider only the nature of man but related to a certain subject, whereas by man I consider that same nature simply in itself not related to anyone. Wherefore the understanding of universals is rightly spoken of as ...
