rest of the North Caucasus, where it fights Islamist terrorists, separatists, and bandits." ( Dmitri Trenin. "Reading Russia Right," Policy Brief # 42 Special Edition. October 2005. Available online at # "justify"> s southern rim breeds frustration, and leads to human rights abuses that only serve to attract new fighters to the cause. In the words of the Kremlin s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the "subterranean fire" of regional instability continues to rage unabated. (Ibid). For this reason the Caucasus will continue to be an area of ​​vital national interest to Russia. The old East-West axis that pinned NATO forces against a massive Soviet conventional army is gone and the new era of the Southern offensive has been ushered in. The after-effect of the disastrous first Chechen war was a shift in strategic focus. As Dmitri Trenin noted:
"Central European plains were replaced by the Caucasus mountains (and potentially, the mountains and deserts of Central Asia); familiar peer enemies by primitive but deadly warriors; operations of groups of armies were replaced with a mixture of counter-insurgency operations, special forces engagements [and] police mopping up campaigns ". (Dmitri Trenin. "Russia s Foreign and Security Policy under Putin," Carnegie Endowment (2005) the longest border on Russian unstable Southern rift zone, Georgia has figured prominently in Moscow s foreign and security strategy. Russian key interests in Georgia are characterized by efforts to ensure regional stability, retain military influence, "protect" the Russian diaspora and increase economic ties. Each of these goals is developed below to provide a glimpse of Russian view of the Caucasus.chapter then examines the cultural, diplomatic, economic and military means that Russia has used to advance its agenda in Georgia. Finally, these efforts are compared to the tenets of Tsygankov s Great Power Normalization model to determine whether they meet its criteria of a pragmatic Russian approach to foreign policy.
Regional Stability
Caucasus have historically served as a buffer between the Orthodox Christian empire and Muslim powers to Russia s south. That geopolitical reality has not changed. With what Russians generally refer to as "Wahhabi" (Salafi) influence growing in Uzbekistan and inside Russia itself, Moscow is deeply concerned about instability in its "soft underbelly." Source of the instability, Chechnya, is largely a secessionist crisis and the subject of Western criticism that Russia s heavy handed military operations in the region created an environment where militant Islam could get a foothold . (Chechen rebels, looking...
