political levers it can use to influence its smaller neighbors, the most effective of which are their internal secessionist conflicts. A March 2005 EU country report, drafted as part of its neighborhood action plans, described progress toward reform in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and providing detailed overviews of their progress toward adopting EU values ​​such as rule of law, democracy, and a market economy. The EU generally considers Georgia to be the most advanced of its Caucasian neighbors with relatively few problems identified in terms of domestic political reforms. Of note incriticism of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are breaches of fundamental freedoms, a general lack of willingness to reform and "widespread Russian influence on decision making in both Armenia and Azerbaijan." Perhaps emboldened by the EU s hesitation to become directly involved in helping resolve Georgia s "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or assist in monitoring the border between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has continued to make the most of its political mechanisms. One includes its veto in the OSCE, an organization Georgia has sought to involve to a greater degree in its internal stability efforts. Since the establishment of a Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire 1992, a four-party Mixed (or Joint) Control Commission has been responsible for monitoring and implementing the peace. The Commission is comprised of representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and Russia's oblast of North Ossetia, a composition that seems blatantly biased toward South Ossetia. Georgia has long lobbied that the Commission in its current format is "ineffective" and that the OSCE and other international organizations should take a morepart in developing and implementing a peace process. In Georgia s opinion, whenever Russia feels that the role of the Commission in the conflict resolution process is threatened, Moscow orchestrates a minor concession or position that demonstrates the Commission < span align = "justify"> s utility to outside observers and ensures Russia continued political leverage. An even more potent lobbying tool is Moscow s sponsorship of Georgia s two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as those in Moldova and Azerbaijan). Both separatist regions are highly dependent on Moscow for support and therefore highly susceptible to Kremlin influence. Most South Ossetian citizens hold Russian passports and Russian laws provide the breakaway region with its legal code.region s ties with Russia provide it with what little economic activity exists in the area. Several Russian officials have even been appointed to posts within the breakaway region s government, which provokes concern in Tbilisi. ...
