at views the concept of power and interests in opposition may be understood on the premise of the actor s preferences remaining constant. An ideational explanation, however, stems from a change in the actor s perceptions of its interests. In either case, employing ideas to explain behavioural changes necessitates identification of the changes in the actor s concept of its interests, that is, its sense of identity, value system and standards of behaviour.and material interpretations of adjustments in Qing foreign policy necessitate distinguishing purely material, materially cognitive, and purely conceptual explanations.material interpretations of state behaviour are based on the objective distribution of tangible power. Aspirations, beliefs, and other ideas are not considered as relevant variables. This type of analysis is generally championed by Realist scholars. Perhaps, the most representative example is Kenneth Waltz s Theory of International Politics. With Waltz s theoretical framework, state behavior is largely determined by the pressure generated by the international system, and therefore can not be viewed as an expression of a nation s subjective desires. Waltz argues that the structure of the system works as a selecting function because structures select by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others, outcomes can not be inferred from intentions and behavior. Insofar as selection rules, results can be predicted whether or not the actors intentions and whether or not they understand structural constraints are known. In other words, the actor may or may not be cognizant of structural restrictions on its behavior or, although aware of them, may not necessarily behave in the way most likely to be rewarded, or least likely to be punished; it is the structure that plays the main role as regards the effect of the actor s choice, structure being the deciding factor as to what kind of competitor is most likely to succeed. Within this theory the actor s ideas, therefore, are unimportant.variance in this body of logic maintains that material factors have a strong bearing on ideational elements. That is to say, in time actors ideas adapt to the material reality, the underlying logic being that erroneous cognition of the outside world could lead actors to suboptimal situations that ultimately cause them to adjust their behavior. As material factors provide impetus for such a process, it may be classed as a material explanation.regards the international system, cognitive material-based interpretations, in common with purely material explanations, proceed on the assumption that there has been no change in the actors preferences. Cognitive material explanations concern the behaviour of nations as it is affected by the actors level of cognition of the international environment, the power dynamics among states, and the capabilities of rivals. They account for the situation where, despite all material factors remaining constant, changes in an actor s cognition of the outside world result in behavioral adjustments.is a body of accumulated, world-related data. A general understanding of it is manifest in an objective view of the world. Explaining the behavior of an enterprise from an economics standpoint requires much more information than the functions of cost and demand; other factors, such as the industry s history, also imbue a great deal of useful information relevant to understanding enterprise behavior. Similarly, in international relations, the information on which a country bases its view of the outside world is likely to be based predominantly on the balance of power, manifest in forms and modes of behavior. Variances in these two factors can lead to differences in state behavior. When inferring a country s behavior, an analysis at the unit level, necessitates a substantial fund of relevant knowledge, including expectations of behavior. An analysis based on preferences and desires, rather than knowledge of the outside world, can not determine how an actor will behave because desires do not fully account for the conditions under which action occurs. An actor s knowledge and expectations do not feature in the content of many rational choice-based analyses because their hypothetical actors have complete knowledge., The knowledge that nations will always strive to enhance their security and economic interests is insufficient to predict how they will act. Other kinds of information, such as the state under observation s knowledge of the international system, of its own strength and the reliability of its partners, are relevant when predicting its behavior. Scholars have demonstrated beyond doubt the utility of additional information of this nature in understanding state behavior. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, for example, have shown that it is policymakers perception of the offence-defense balance rather than the actual disparity between offensive and defensive capa...
